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ABSTRACT
Lee, Sun Gu, M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 2008. An
Analysis of the Influence of CEO Characteristics on Research and Development
Expenditures in Large Corporations (2005 Data).

This study analyzes the influence exerted by CEO characteristics (specifically,
CEO stockholding percentages and CEO age) on research and development (R&D)
expenditures in large American corporations over the twenty year period from 1986 to
2005. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market share
concentrations, and making specific reference to two Schumpeterian hypotheses on the
correlation between R&D and increases in firm size, this study establishes a positive
linear relationship between the dependent variable, R&D expenditure, and the
independent variables of CEO stockholding, CEO age, firm size, and market share. This
study next describes the corporate and market conditions which promote the development
of a positive linear relationship between CEO characteristics and R&D and concludes by
identifying the point of high market concentration at which the prominence of R&D
activity is superseded by expenditures for advertising.
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I.

Introduction

This thesis assesses the extent to which research and development (R&D)
expenditures in large American corporations over the past two decades are determined by
and directly related to the three following operational and structural factors within the
corporate environment:

1) The percentages of stocks which CEO’s hold in the companies they
head (considered in relation to CEO age and tenure).
2) The growth in firm size and scale (measured in net sales) relative to the
increase in a firm’s market concentration (measured by the HerfmdahlHirschman Index).
3) The supplanting of R&D expenditures by advertising expenditures as
market dominance evolves past the oligopolistic level, at which point
market dominance is shared by a few companies, to the monopolistic
control of a given market by a single company.

By establishing a positive linear relationship between substantial CEO
stockholdings and R&D expenditures (within a context inclusive of low to oligopolistic
market concentrations), this thesis argues that this type of correlation results largely from
the CEOs’ perception that they share a common interest in company growth and profit
with external stockholders. This perception of the potential for shared benefit is identified
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as evidence of convergence of interest between CEO’s and stockholders. Conversely,
entrenchment of CEO interest occurs when the CEO’s recognition of shared interest with
stockholders is obscured by self-interest causing the CEO to avoid investment in R&D
out of concern for protecting his or her personal assets in the company.

Pursuant to this argument, the shift from R&D to advertising (occurring as the
monopolistic threshold is approached) is the result of the CEO’s realization that at this
point advertising has a more proven utility for profit generation than R&D. Therefore, the
supplanting of R&D by advertising at the monopolistic level is an extension of
convergence thinking, not a departure from it, because the benefits of profit generation
continue to accrue to CEO’s and stockholders alike as total market dominance is reached.
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CEO Risk-Avoidance Motives and Their Effect on R&D

As the preeminent corporate insiders, CEO’s of large corporations possess a
complete range of detailed information on the daily operations, long-range goals, and
overall financial status and prospects of the corporate entities they direct. Inherently, their
intimate access to vital financial data is both impetus and resource for effective and
profitable managerial decisions. An ethical pitfall occurs, however, in the familiar case of
CEO’s whose personal assets consist largely of substantial stockholdings in their own
companies. Having unlimited financial data at their fingertips, CEO’s in this category
often tend to disregard corporate growth in favor of protecting their own investments by
reducing or limiting expenditures for R&D projects which have a discemable risk
potential. As usually formulated, this risk-avoidance tendency among CEO’s with
substantial stockholdings in their own companies can only be understood as a function of
the CEO’s reprehensible and unethical self-interest.

As a business strategy, spending money on R&D poses a high degree of
risk for large corporations, or for a firm of any size. CEO’s with large stockholdings,
particularly those of advanced age (60 years and older) and therefore close to retirement,
could be inclined to decentralize their financial risks and be motivated by inordinate
fiscal cautiousness. Accordingly (as the theory goes), high stockholding CEO’s who are
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close to retirement age and who, by virtue of their position in the company, possess
preemptive knowledge and decision-making authority, could tend to invest less robustly
and less frequently in R&D projects, particularly those which seem likely to jeopardize
the CEO’s personal assets in the company.

This tendency of CEO’s to avoid or radically curtail R&D projects in order to
safeguard their personal assets is usually attributed to the following three risk-avoidance
0
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motives: 1) Risk-reduction Motive , 2) Shirking Motive , and 3) Short-term Focus
Motive3. Each of these motives reflects the general CEO tendency cited above to avoid
projects which could threaten their own financial interests to the potential detriment of
corporate profitability. On this basis, these motives are grouped within the general
category of CEO risk-avoidance.

Risk-reduction Motive
The risk-reduction motive pertains in particular to a CEO’s treatment of R&D
projects in the mid to high-risk range. The term reflects intransigence on the part of the
CEO regarding any project which, based upon precedent and a compelling supportive
data, does not guarantee or even strongly indicate a high profit result. In essence,
perception of even a moderate degree of risk for the corporation is construed as a
prohibitive risk of personal loss for the CEO. The CEO’s reaction to this perception is to

1Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. 1981. “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers” The
Bell Journal o f Economics, 12:2, pp. 605-617.
2 Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. 1972 “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization ” The
American Economic Review, 62:5, pp. 777-795.
3 Narayanan, M. P. 1985. “Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results” The Journal o f Finance, 5:5, pp.
1469 - 1484 .
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reject projects on the basis of a single criterion (i.e., risk of loss to himself) with the result
that many projects in the reasonable risk category are not given judicious consideration.

Shirking Motive
The shirking motive impugns the risk-avoiding CEO with the moral failing of
shirking the responsibility to implement, or perhaps even to fairly consider, R&D projects
which by objective standards show at least the potential to alleviate a financial crisis or
otherwise strengthen the company’s status in areas of critical or urgent need. An extreme
example of this general pattern is the case of CEO’s who, in an abysmal act of selfregard, withhold approval of R&D projects even in the absence of a high-risk potential,
solely because their contracts would not reward them directly for the project’s success.

Short-term Focus Motive
The short-run or short-term focus motive is essentially a restrictive, self-imposed
myopia. It describes the tendency of the self-protective CEO to approve only those R&D
projects which convincingly demonstrate a maximum potential for profit generation
within a short interval (and usually while providing a direct contribution to the CEO’s
assets.) Within this framework, only those R&D projects which show minimal risk
potential to the CEO’s stockholdings, as well as the least interval between expenditure
and personal reward to the CEO, are likely to be considered.
The theory of CEO risk avoidance is underscored interestingly by Peter (2005)
who contends that older CEO’s use clever coping-strategies to compensate for
shortcomings associated with age -shortcomings such as diminished mental acuity and

5

emotional assuredness.4 These strategies might include the optimizing of increased verbal
skills which are said to accompany maturity. For example, although memory gradually
declines after the age of twenty, vocabulary and verbal skills are enhanced. The
augmented verbal skills of older CEOs, reinforced by their years of practical experience,
may be effective means of facilitating and disguising avoidance of R&D projects.

Viewed within the context of these three risk-avoidance motives, the CEO profile
which emerges is a complex of unrestricted authority, narrowness, and greed. The
intrinsic asymmetry which exists between the CEO and external stockholders in terms of
investment and authority could therefore cause stockholders to suffer the adverse
consequences of decisions made by the aging, tenured CEO. If, motivated by selfinterest, a CEO avoids investing energetically in R&D projects which show the potential
to enhance stock value and corporate profit, he or she plainly impairs company growth in
order to protect personal interests.

4 Peter, C. 2005. “Old. Smart. Productive. Surprise! The Graying of the Workforce is Better News than You
Think” Business Week, pp. 78-86
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Literature Review: Entrenchment of Interest vs. Convergence of Interest

The actual practices of older, large stockholding CEO’s with regard to their
company’s R&D expenditures are usually assessed within the context of two differing
hypotheses:
1) Entrenchment of CEO Interest Hypothesis; and
2) Convergence of CEO Interest Hypothesis.

The entrenchment of interest hypothesis states that substantial CEO stockholding
widens the disparity between CEO and stockholder interests with a deadening effect on
R&D. Further, the entrenchment hypothesis asserts that, dominated by their desire to
protect and maximize their substantial stockholdings, CEO’s either refuse to, or lose the
capability to, recognize their common bond with external stockholders and can even
begin to regard stockholders’ interests as inimical to their own interests. Entrenched
within this restricted purview, CEO’s succumb to self-interest causing one or all of the
aforementioned trio of risk-avoidance motives to become operative. As a result, R&D is
relegated to occupying an entrenched position on the corporate back burner. This point of
view is argued notably by Dechow and Sloan (1991)5. They assert that, driven by selfinterest, CEO’s with large stockholding percentages not only invest less in R&D in

5 Dechow, P. and Sloan, R. 1991. “Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An Empirical
Investigation” Journal o f Accounting and Economics, V ol.14, pp. 51-89.
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general, but also will demonstrate greater aversion to R&D projects as they approach
their final years in the company.

The opposing view, the convergence of interest hypothesis, contends that large
CEO stockholdings actually reduce and can even nullify apparent disparities between
CEO and stockholder interests resulting in increased, rather than reduced, implementation
of R&D projects. The convergence hypothesis is a function of the CEOs’ enlightened
perception that they and the stockholders are part of the same corporate entity. CEO’s
with substantial investment in their companies will be likely to recognize that the
corporation’s growth benefits them and the stockholders simultaneously and mutually.
Therefore, increases in CEO stockholding percentages increase the possibility of a
convergence of interest between CEO’s and stockholders.

This hypothesis is also endorsed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)6 who argue that
a CEOs’ recognition of fundamental corporate solidarity prompts them to be more open
to longer-range R&D projects which demonstrate the potential to be profitable for them
and the stockholders alike, as opposed to favoring only shorter term projects which
promise both quicker profitability and less risk of personal loss. Support for Jensen and
Meckling’s viewpoint is offered by Cho (1992)7 and Francis and Smith(1995)8. Cho
offers evidence that as a CEO’s stock share increases, expenditures for R&D increase

6 Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976. “Theory o f the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure” Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.3, pp. 305-360.
7 Cho, S. 1992. “Agency Costs, Management Stockholding, and Research and Development Expenditures”
Seoul Journal o f Economics, Vol.5, pp. 127-152.
8 Francis, J. and Smith, A. 1995. “Agency Costs and Innovation: Some Empirical Evidence” Journal o f
Accounting and Economics, V ol.19, pp. 383-409.

proportionally. Francis and Smith argue that in “closely-held” firms in which the CEO
owns at least 30 per cent of the voting stock, or in which the CEO’s group owns at least
20 per cent of the voting stock, a higher level of R&D projects are implemented than in
their more “diffusedly-held” counterparts.

Demetz and Lehn (1985) 9 offer support of more general nature for the
convergence hypothesis arguing that the structure of a firm’s ownership, more than the
percentage of CEO stockholding, is the principal factor determining how the benefits of a
given enterprise will be distributed among executives and general stockholders. They,
however, assert also that high CEO stockholdings exert a positive influence on financial
earning rates, the benefits of which necessarily accrue to both CEO’s and stockholders.
Again, Demetz (1983)10, in concurrence with Fama and Jensen (1983)11, argues that
increases in CEO stockholding percentages to high levels enhance an enterprise’s overall
value.
Hill and Snell (1989)12 put forth a differing and more neutral point of view. They
contend that considered on a per employee basis no statistically significant relationship
exists between CEO stockholding percentages and R&D expenditures. In the same vein,
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)13, in their examination of the relationship between
CEO stockholding and discretionary power of management within large corporations,
9 Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. 1985. “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”
Journal o f Political Economy, Vol.93, pp. 1155-1177.
10 Demsetz, H. 1983. “The Structure o f Ownership and the Theory o f Firm” Journal o f Law and
Economics, Vol.26, pp. 375-390.
11 Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control” Journal o f Law and
Economics, Vol.26, pp. 301-325.
12 Hill, C. W. L. and Snell, S. A. 1989. “Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate
Productivity” Academy o f Management Journal, Vol.32, pp. 25-46.
13 Morck, R. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1988 “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
Empirical Analysis” Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.20, pp. 293-315.
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disavow a precise linear relationship between these two factors. They conclude that high
percentages of CEO stockholding do not lead necessarily to either conversion or
entrenchment of interest. According to Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny, the discretionary
powers of management which CEO’s exercise, and which prominently include R&D
decisions, are determined by variable CEO characteristics such as age and tenure which
exert their influence independent of CEO stockholding percentages.

While it might seem plausible that low CEO stockholdings favor convergence of
interest with stockholders, and conversely that high levels favor entrenchment, the
literature cited above presents a range of diverse opinion and argues that a number of
factors other than risk-avoidance driven by self-interest be taken into account in the
assessment of the factors affecting CEO attitudes toward R&D. These studies either
tacitly question or directly argue against the contention that the three risk-avoidance
motives already discussed (i.e., risk reduction, shirking, and short-term focus)
unavoidably or even necessarily cause CEO entrenchment of interest leading to the
curtailing of R&D expenditures. Considered collectively, these studies prompt similar
and related questions: Can high CEO stockholdings coexist with and/or effectively
promote a productive CEO identification with the interests of external stockholders? In
what ways could such a potential for convergence of interest increase the potential for
greater corporate profit and long-range viability through investment in R&D?

To address these questions, this study next considers the correlation between CEO
stockholdings and the percentages of both R&D and advertising expenditures. This
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correlation is considered within the context of three main factors: 1) increase in firm size;
2) variations in market concentration; and 3) the transformational trend in the national
corporate environment from oligopolistic to monopolistic structures. The frame of
reference within which these three factors is examined is provided by two familiar
Schumpeterian hypotheses which state that increases in firm size and in market
concentration are accompanied by increases in R&D expenditures.
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Research and Development in the Context of Schumpeterian Hypotheses

Two studies (cited below) which examine recent increases in R&D expenditures
in large American corporations indicate a correlation between R&D increases and two
closely related factors:
1) increase in firm size; and
2) increase in a firm’s market concentration.
Scherer(1965)14 affirms that growth in firm size and market concentration are positively
linked to R&D expenditures. Thirty years later, Scherer’s findings were confirmed by
Blundell, Griffith, and Reenen (1995)15.

Further, each of these studies corroborates two interrelated Schumpeterian
hypotheses as follows: 1) Increases in a firm’s scale and size are accompanied by
increases in R&D expenditures and activities; and 2) Increases in size and scale which
also stimulate intensification of market concentration result in an even greater increase in
R&D activity. These two Schumpeterian hypotheses also assert that the aforementioned

14 Scherer, F. M. 1965 “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output of Patented Innovations”
American Economic Review, Vol.55, pp. 1097-1125.
15 Blundell, R. Griffith, R. and Reenen, J. V. 1995. “Dynamic Count Data Models o f Technological
Innovation” The Economic Journal Vol. 105, pp. 333-344.
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increase in R&D generates an expansion of the firm’s efforts in technological
innovation16 as a significant component of the invigorated R&D activity.

Each of these hypotheses is further corroborated by two separate studies: Cohen
and Levin (1989)17 and Symeonidis (1996)18. These studies also contend, however, that
the long-standing Schumpeterian-based view of R&D activities needs to be reevaluated
in light of the ongoing structural evolution within corporate America toward oligopolistic
conglomerates and monopolies. Driven to overcome the uncertainty, high costs, and risks
inherent in highly competitive markets, more and more oligopolistic partnerships
continue to emerge in corporate America. Reducing and in some cases eliminating
competition by means of monopolistic-type controls, oligopolistic partnerships acquire
dominantly high market concentrations which increasingly approached total market
dominance.
Analyzing the increasing proportion of high market concentrations produced by
oligopolistic partnerships, studies such as those by Cohen and Levin and Symeonidis

16 When a market becomes unstable, larger corporations can turnover more capital into R&D than smaller
firms. As a result, larger firms which possess huge sales are better able to distribute their funds , derived
from fixed costs, into technological innovation.
Moreover, large oligopolistic corporations can better predict the market due to their dominance, and based
on their predictions, generate larger profits which can be used for technological
innovation.
17 Cohen, W. M. and Levin, R, C. 1989. “Empirical Studies o f Innovation and Market Structure” in
Schmalensee, R. and Willing, R. eds., Handbook o f Industrial Organization, Vol.2, pp. 1059-1107.
18 Symeonidis, G, 1996, “Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and
Some New Themes” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 161.
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show that these high market concentrations are due less to R&D than to a range of
marketing strategies. Specifically, advertising strategies such as television ads, mall and
billboard displays, and conspicuous logos on clothing and other products are pervasively
present in everyday life, as well as being readily understood by consumers in every part
of the country from urban to rural locales. Consequently, within the emergent
oligopolistic structure, high market concentrations enjoyed by major firms have caused
brand name recognition to be a potent influence on consumer behavior, thus reducing
both the need for and the effectiveness of R&D. As higher and greater market
concentrations are reached, expenditures for advertising are effectively replacing R&D
expenditures, thereby challenging the Schumpeterian hypothesis cited above that increase
in firm size and market concentration are principally a function of R&D activities.

In their recent analysis of the impact of advertising in the oligopolistic
environment, Pepall, Richards, and Norman(2005) demonstrate that high market
concentrations are achieved by the power of advertising due to the commanding influence
exerted by brand names. They assert that “the monopoly power associated with highly
concentrated industries that generate advertising expenditures cause concentration to be
high.” 19

Another significant effect of the reliance on advertising in the growing trend
90

toward oligopolistic market structures was suggested by Telser(1964) . Firms with low

19 Pepall, L. Richards, D. J. and Norman, G. 2005. “Advertising, Competition, and Brand Names”
Industrial Organization Contemporary Theory & Practice; third edition, pp. 550.
20 Telser, L. 1964 “Advertising and Competition” Journal o f Political Economy, Vol.72, pp. 537-562.

14

market concentrations often have high advertising expenditures relative to R&D. These
firms in this category, recognizing the need to remain competitive with the dominant
oligopolistic firms, increase advertising expenditures as an effective means of increasing
their level of market concentration. Thus, the dominance of oligopolistic firms with high
market concentrations creates a growing widespread need for companies need to achieve
higher and higher market concentrations. As a result, a national corporate pattern
emerges favoring advertising over R&D.
Figure 1 below illustrates the general pattern of parallel increases in advertising
expenditures and market concentrations which occurs as the corporate trend continues to
evolve from oligopoly toward monopoly.

Figure 1: Relationship Between Advertising and Market Concentration

+
Increasing Advertising
Expenditures

+
(Oligopoly................ -> Monopoly)

Increasing Market Concentration (HHI)
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Figure 2 below illustrates the general pattern of decline in R&D expenditures,
which occurs in firms with established high market concentrations (HF1I) as the corporate
trend continues to evolve from oligopoly toward monopoly.

Figure 2: Relationship Between R&D and Market Concentration

+
Declining
R&D Expenditures

+
(O ligop oly - ........................M onopoly)

Increasing Market Concentration (HHI)
A reexamination of the Schumpeterian hypothesis required by the oligopolistic
transformation indicates first, the effectiveness of advertising as market concentrations
intensify; and second, that as the current corporate environment trends more and more
toward oligopoly, R&D is not as likely to increase in unison with firm size and market
concentration.
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The current trend in the corporate environment is comprised of increasing
oligopolistic market dominance evolving toward monopolistic market dominance. This
trend reveals that, contrary to the Schumpeterian hypotheses, R&D is less likely to
increase as market concentrations intensify and instead is more likely to be replaced by
the proven effectiveness of advertising in the current corporate climate. One obvious and
basic reason for this change in emphasis is simply that the more a high-concentration
company spends on advertising, the less revenue is available for R&D. At the same time,
as Pepall, Richards, and Norman (2005) have established, a more substantive reason for
the conspicuous de-emphasis on R&D in recent decades is the effectiveness of
advertising in achieving and maintaining dominance in the oligopolistic marketplace.
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II.

TWO HYPOTHESES

The research and opinion surveyed thus far provide a framework to determine
how R&D expenditures are used to measure convergence of interest between CEO’s and
external stockholders. More specifically, this information defines the effect which such a
convergence of interest has on R&D expenditures in corporate markets with different
levels of industry concentration. This information will now be examined within the
context of two major hypotheses as follows:

Hypothesis I
An increase in CEO stockholdings within a company approaching
oligopolistic status leads to a positive linear relationship between high
stockholdings and a firm’s R&D expenditures.

Hypothesis II
As a firm’s market structure advances from oligopoly to monopoly, R&D
expenditures decrease and are supplanted by a broad range of advertising
expenditures.
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The CEO risk-avoidance motives, identified in section I as functions of
entrenchment of CEO interest, are viewed as a major impediment to R&D expenditures
in large corporations. Several recent studies (cited above) which question the accuracy of
this notion, point out that the CEO’s tendency to avoid the financial risks inherent in
long-range R&D projects diminishes with the development of the following conditions:
1) the firm’s HHI expands, first achieving a major share of dominance in a given market,
and then evolves from the oligopolistic level toward monopolistic dominance; and 2) the
CEO’s stockholding increases concomitantly with these major increases in HHI.

When these points of growth in market concentration are reached, CEO
entrenchment of interest gives way to a convergence of interest with external
stockholders. As this occurs, the CEO’s entrenchment thinking is displaced by the CEO’s
recognition of the common interest they share with stockholders in maximizing corporate
growth and profitability. Viewed in this context, increase in firm size and market
dominance induces CEO’s to value their unity with external stockholders and to act upon
this perception by investing in R&D projects, which demonstrate the potential to promote
corporate growth.

Further, with regard to R&D, the CEO who possesses high stockholdings in a
firm with growing market share abandons the ‘what’s in it for meT risk-avoidance
attitude for an attitude favoring R&D expenditures for projects, both long-term and short
term, which show a measurable degree of profit potential for both himself and the
stockholders (a ‘what’s in it for u sT attitude). The incentive to invest robustly in R&D
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results therefore from the CEO’s perception that the potential for his personal benefit is
connected integrally with overall corporate profits and thus with the personal gain of the
stockholders as well. The continuing increase of conglomerates in corporate America has
resulted in a radical reduction if not elimination of competition. In companies enjoying
monopoly, the CEO’s perception of shared interest with stockholders can generate a
climate conducive to a strengthening of interest convergence between the two, rather than
a furthering of CEO entrenchment.

In contrast to the aforementioned Schumpeterian hypothesis, the high, and
(following the current trend) often maximized market concentration which oligopolistic
and monopolistic firms achieve does not ensure increased R&D expenditures. Instead,
when these high levels of market dominance are reached, advertising expenditures
(usually of the “invisible” variety in the form of branding) take the place of revenue spent
on R&D. In essence, by virtue of a sustained superiority in market position,
conglomerates and monopolies enjoy a diminished need to invest in R&D in order to
develop new high quality products. They choose instead to invest in familiar, highrecognition advertising venues confident that consumers will continue to respond
vigorously to the images and concepts which are both familiar and ubiquitous in the
media, malls, and retail chains which saturate the prevailing consumer monoculture.
At these high levels of market concentration, the risk avoidance motives
responsible for CEO entrenchment and R&D reduction are therefore likely to be
neutralized. Advertising expenditures in a monopolistic setting pose no substantial threat
to the CEO’s stockholdings comparable to those posed by the uncertainties of R&D
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projects. Contrary to Schumpeterian Hypothesis 2, R&D expenditures decrease rather
than increase at the monopolistic level even though firm size and HHI are maximized. At
this level, corporate profits are also maximized making advertising in established venues
to a growing consumer monoculture both less risky and more effective, thus benefiting
corporate principals and external stockholders alike.
Figure 3: A Trend in R&D from Oligopolistic to Monopolistic Market Status

Figure 3, below, describes the decline in R&D which occurs when low
competition (oligopolistic) market concentrations develop into competition-free
(monopolistic) market concentrations.
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III.

Data and Methods

Data Sources
In this study, cross-sectional data from 44 firms representing a wide diversity of
industries is chosen to represent current R&D trends in large American conglomerates.
Each of the firms considered has the largest rate of market share in its respective market.

Market concentration data for this study is taken from the Market Share Report
2007 for 2005. Data on the 44 firms is derived from the Standard Industrial Classification
Manual (SIC) from 1420 to 7375 (Appendix A). Data on R&D expenditures and on net
sales is derived from Thomson Research and Mergent Online.

Each firm’s annual report and proxy statement is used to obtain CEO
stockholding percentages and CEO ages in 2005.

Table 1(below) illustrates the relationship between the independent variable of
R&D expenditure and the independent variables of CEO characteristics (stockholding
and age), firm scale (net sales), and market share (HHI).
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Table 1: Dependent and Independent Variables

D efinition s

V ariables

Real R&D expenditure in firms

R&D expenditure

Dependent variable

CEO

CEO stockholding

Amount o f C EO ’s stockholding

Independent

characteristics

CEO age

C EO ’s age

variables

Schumpeterian

Scale

N et sales

hypothesis

HHI

H erfindahl-Hirschman Index

Definitions
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures
As indicated in Table 1, the dependent variable of R&D expenditure is a firm’s
real, verifiable expenditure on research and development within a given time frame.

Independent Variables
As indicated in Table 1, the independent variables considered in this study include
CEO stockholding (real amount share), CEO age, firm size (net sales), and market
concentration (HHI).
The use of firm scale and HHI as independent variables is required for the
analysis of the Schumpeterian hypotheses which define direct correlations between
increases in scale, market share, and R&D (summarized above in section I.)

HHI determines a specific percentage of a market structure. Accordingly, if a firm
provides all the output in a given market, the pure monopoly value of the HHI should be
10,000. Since this method integrates the number of firms in a market and the discrepancy
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in their sizes, this study uses HHI rather than other methods such as three firm
concentration (CR3) and Lemer Index (LI).

Methods of Analysis

Table 2 (below) displays the type and level of observations - minimum,
maximum, mean, and standard deviation—used in this study to establish correlations
between R&D expenditure and the independent variables of CEO age and stockholding,
and firm scale and market concentration.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

N

N am e of Variables

M inim um

M axim um

Mean

Std. D eviation

R&D Expenditure

Dependent
Variable

44

32,338

7,392,000,000

1,247,993,439.5

2,008,561,591.43

44

6,625

1,017,499,336

32,603,821.28

156,347,785.73

44

36

68

55.23

6.62224453

44

61,911,000

192,604,000,000

25,901,739,409.1

34,998,550,178.9

44

1,333

7,450

3204.95

1,589.12

CEO stockholding

CEO characteristics
CEO age

Independent
variables

Scale
Schumpeterian
hypothesis
HHI
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The sample size consists of 44 firms, and the average R&D expenditure is
$1,247,993 dollars.

The average CEO stock-holding amount is 432,603,821. The average CEO age is
55.23. The average scale is $25,901,739,409 dollars. The average HHI is 3,204.95. Based
on this sample size (44), there is no need for concern about the assumption of normality
because the degree of freedom (N-l) is over 40.

Based on a selection of 44 companies from 43 diverse industries, this study
broadly selects data from the SIC code (from 1420 to 7300) which is reported by the
Market Share Report 2007 for 2005. Since the sample firms are not selected from a
limited number of industries, the observations have a broadly-based significance and
application. Additionally, the firms selected have the most dominant market share in their
respective markets, making them representative of large-sized corporations.

Finally, this study uses two semi log-level models (below) to examine correlations
between R&D and each of the independent variables cited. (In order to demonstrate an
integrated representation of all four of the factors affecting R&D, semi log-level models
are used here as an alternative to log-level models.)

25

Models

Model 1 describes a nonlinear relationship between a dependent variable (R&D
expenditure) and independent variables (CEO stockholding and age; firm scale (net sales
growth); and market share (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)).

\og(R&D expenditure) = Bo + fiiCEOstockholding + pjCEOstockholdingsquare +
fECEOage + ftjCEOagesquare + [EScale + (J>[Scalesquare +
[RHH1 + P4HHIsquare + u

Model 2 describes a linear relationship between a dependent variable (R&D
expenditure) and independent variables (CEO stockholding and age; firm scale (net sales
growth); and market share (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)).

\og(R&D expenditure) = po + fECEOstockholding + (ECEOage + /??Scale + [EHEII + u
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IV.

Results

Model 1, below, specifies the non-linear relationship between the dependent
variable of R&D expenditures and the four independent variables cited above (all shown
here to have a 60% variability).

Model 1

Log (R&D expenditure) = - 3.494 + 1356CEOstockholding- \A50CEOstockholdingsquare
T-statistic
[-0.261]
[1.324]
[-1.092]

T-statistic

+ OJ19CEOage —O.Q06CEOagesquare + 7.816Scale
[1.552]
[-1.312]
[4.089]***

T-statistic

—2.803Sealesquare
[-2.496]**

—

0.002H H I + 2.133 H H Isquare
[-1.893]*
[1.718]*

Number o f observations = 44
R-square = 0.601
Adjusted R-square = 0.509
Durbin-Watson = 1.808

* * * p < .001

**p< .002
*p<m

Significant components within this model are first, the aforementioned
independent variables, all of which have positive signs; and, second, the square of each
variable, all of which having negative signs.
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As established previously (in section II, above), due to the complexities of various
closely related risk-avoidance motives, CEO stockholding and CEO age show diverse
degrees of correlation with R&D. Model 1 (above) identifies the robust R&D investment
of CEO’s possessing a low amount of stocks as being consistent with the conduct of firm
owners with high stockholdings; both utilize aggressive R&D activities as a way of
increasing corporate profits as well as their personal assets. Further, the model indicates
the converse correlation between passive investment in R&D and high levels of CEO
stockholding (especially in the CEO’s later years) as emerging from the desire to reduce
risk to existing holdings.

Thus, Model 1 provides corroboration for the 1991 findings of Dechow and
Sloan, cited above in section I, which indicate that risk-avoidance motives exert a
limiting influence on R&D among older CEOs who have increased stockholdings. At the
same time, the overall pattern delineated in Model 1 confirms both the hypothesis of
convergence of managerial interest with stockholders and the hypothesis of entrenchment
of managerial interest as being relative to and contingent upon differing CEO
stockholding levels.

Figure 4, below, shows that CEO age (+sign) and the square of CEO age (- sign)
have a non-linear relationship with R&D expenditures in the model. This study identifies
65 as the approximate turnaround point at which CEO interest and investment in R&D
begin to decrease. More specifically, CEO’s from 36 to 65 tend to invest aggressively in
R&D, while CEOs from 65 to 68 tend to decrease their investments
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Figure 4: Optimal Age of CEOs

10.779 / (2 * -0.006)| = 64.916666 ~ 65

In addition, Model 1 shows firm scale as having a positive sign and firm scale
squared as having a negative sign, thus establishing a non-linear relationship between the
two independent variables and R&D. Briefly, the model shows that firms with either low
or high firm scale have low R&D expenditure and firms of middle scale have high levels
of R&D expenditure.

With regard to the Schumpeterian hypothesis which states that increases in both
firm scale and size are accompanied by an increase in R&D activity, the data in Model 1
both supports and contradicts the hypothesis as follows: Firms with low net sales and
increased R&D expenditures confirm Schumpeter, while firms which have mid-range net
sales and which are also endeavoring to decrease R&D, disprove Schumpeter. Lastly, in
Model 1 market concentration (HHI) shows a negative sign and the square of HF1I shows
a positive sign, thus implying a non-linear relationship between HHI and R&D. This
aspect of the data is particularly relevant to the de-emphasis on R&D which occurs as
oligopolistic market concentrations evolve toward the monopolistic level.

In essence, Model 1 helps to make clear that R&D activities increase when their
effectiveness as competitive business tools increases. This is most likely to occur in

29

intensely competitive markets in which a few high market concentration firms vie for
supremacy and continues until the conditions of oligopoly are securely established within
the dominance of a limited number of conglomerates. At this point, R&D activities
decline and are replaced by other profitable and less costly marketing strategies,
particularly advertising. This study, therefore, adds support to the findings of Scherer
(1965), Van Reenen (1995), Cohen and Levin (1989), and Symeonidis (1996), (all
basically in line with the two Schumpeterian hypotheses discussed above in section I). In
addition, and as already noted, this study also identifies the point of oligopolistic market
dominance at which considerable more revenue is directed toward advertising.

In contrast to Model 1, Model 2 shows 1) a positive relationship between R&D
and the variables of CEO stockholding, CEO age, and financial scale; and 2) a negative
relationship between R&D and HHI.

Model 2
Log (R&D expenditure) = 14.193 + A.95%CEOstockholding + 0.09\CEOage
T-statistic
[5.181]***
[2.415]**
[2.016]*
T-statistic

+ 3.837Scale -O.OOOHHI
[4.475]*** [-1.699]*

Number o f observations = 44
R-square = 0.464
Adjusted R-square = 0.409
Durbin-Watson = 1.573
* * * p < .001
* * p < . 002
* p < .01
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The independent variables included in Model 2 show a 46% variability as
opposed to the 60% variability in Model 1; both are, however, functions of disparities in
R&D. Furthermore, even though the R square in Model 2 (0.464) is lower than that of
Model 1 (0.601), Model 2 integrates all four significant variables - CEO stockholding,
CEO age, market concentration, and HHI.

More specifically, Model 2 shows a positive relationship between the amount of
CEO stock and R&D expenditure, i.e., a correlated increase in CEO stockholding and
R&D expenditure. Model 2 also indicates a positive relationship between CEO age and
R&D and thereby supports the argument that older CEO’s will tend to invest more
aggressively in R&D than their younger counterparts, thus confirming the 1988 findings
of Morck, Schliefer, and Vishny cited above in section I.

The basic Schumpeterian hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm scale
and R&D is established in Model 2 at the 1% level of significance. The data therefore
provides a broad confirmation that, all other factors being equal, the largest corporations
invest more aggressively in R&D than smaller companies. The model also illustrates that
R&D expenditures and market concentrations are statistically significant at the 10%
level, which is low in comparison to the relationship between scale and R&D.

More precisely, the relationship between market concentration and R&D is shown
to have a negative sign, thereby contradicting the Schumpeterian hypotheses in this one
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particular respect: While in today’s corporate climate, the increasing number of
oligopolistic firms with lower market concentrations (relative to monopolistic firms) tend
to increase the money they spend on R&D, a reduction of R&D expenditures usually
accompanies the maximizing of market concentrations as the level of monopolistic
dominance is approached.
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V.

Conclusion

The data presented in the preceding discussion are intended to delineate the
conditions under which a particular set of independent variables will affect, either
positively or negatively, the underlying policies governing the dependent variable of
R&D expenditures. The principal independent variables considered are as follows:
1) the CEO characteristics of stockholding percentages and age; and
2) the two major firm characteristics of firm scale measured in net sales and firm
market concentration measured as HHI.

From within this framework, two major conclusions are reached about the effect
which these independent variables have upon R&D expenditures in large corporations.
First, CEO stockholding, CEO age (relative to retirement), and firm scale all have a
positive linear relationship with R&D, particularly when the firm is in a competitive
market and is attempting to increase or maximize its hold on a larger market share.
R&D’s proven effectiveness in enhancing firm performance and generating greater
profits motivates CEO’s not only to increase R&D expenditures, but also to continue to
increase their personal stockholdings in the company. Recognition of the obvious benefit
of increasing personal ownership in an increasingly more profitable company ensures that
higher CEO stock-holding and greater R&D expenditure continue to go hand-in-hand.
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This endogenous, positive linear relationship is operable in a firm’s growth until it
reaches oligopolistic market share and scale. Moreover, until this level is reached, the
resultant investment in R&D reflects recognition on the CEO’s part of the mutuality, or
convergence, of financial interest between himself and stockholders and thereby
strengthens the CEO’s willingness to accept measurable risks inherent in the R&D
projects under consideration.

Second, the deviation from this pattern occurs when HE1I, or high market share
concentrations, begin to have a negative linear relationship with R&D at the point of
marked declines in competition. This point is reached when oligopoly evolves into
monopoly and, as a consequence, R&D is displaced by well-proven modes of advertising
as a means of maintaining market dominance. The possibility that this displacement
might be due to cash flow shortages or related fiscal concerns is questionable in light of
the high profitability achieved at the level of oligopoly. It seems more likely that the shift
to advertising as the monopolistic market concentration is approached is due to its
superior effectiveness at this level. Once a huge nation-wide, virtually ‘captive audience’
of consumers both familiar with and having ready access to the company’s product line is
established, advertising generates higher sales and profits than R&D.

These conclusions, therefore, contradict the concept of CEO entrenchment of
interest hypotheses which states that CEO stockholdings and proximity to retirement age
cause CEO’s to deliberately and consistently obstruct R&D projects to safeguard their
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own assets. The shift from R&D to advertising which occurs at the higher levels of
market dominance is more likely a matter of deliberate choice than either narrow selfinterest or financial necessity.

As discussed in section I, the risk-reduction, shirking, and short-run CEO motives
often are held to cause self-interested CEO’s to avoid or even impede R&D projects
which could be vital to corporate growth. Model 2 delineates the plausibility of this type
of negative linear relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D. The model shows
further that this relationship could occur even when CEO stock levels are at a relatively
low level and when the likelihood of financial loss due to ineffectual R&D projects is not
pronounced. Moreover, it is frequently argued that CEO’s with high stockholdings are
likely to safeguard their assets by investing in projects which have lower risk than R&D.

The general import of the conclusions reached in this thesis is that the data
considered here argues against a negative concept of the self-protective, self-interested
CEO. Instead, the data favors the view that CEO’s are more likely to rationally appraise
the utility of R&D as a means of increasing sales and market share for the mutual benefit
of the corporation as a whole. Until the turning point of monopolistic market control is
reached, it is the CEO’s perception of increased profitability and long-range viability
which motivates increased spending for R&D.
With regard to the market concentration factor, the data considered here
demonstrate that both high and low concentrations lead to high levels of R&D activities
while in firms with mid-range concentrations invest less robustly in R&D. Furthermore,
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the data argue that the negative influence of standard risk-avoidance motives are
overcome due either to the urgent need to establish a market foothold in a competitive
market (low HHI) or to the security and optimism inspired by commanding market share
(high HHI).

Overall, increases in profits and stronger market position which accompany
increase in firm size result in a predominantly positive linear relationship between CEO
stockholding and R&D expenditures. This study therefore affirms the Schumpeterian
hypothesis equating increase in firm size and R&D with the qualification that this
relationship is interrupted at the point of transition from oligopolistic to monopolistic
conditions. At this point, advertising expenditures take the place of R&D expenditures by
virtue of their proven effectiveness in the conglomerate monomarket which has become
the dominant pattern in corporate America.
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VI.

Appendices

Appendix A. —Cross-Sectional Data of Firms
Code
SIC
1420
2013
2022
2032
2038
2043
2066
2520
2631
2631
2672
2676
2761
2821
2833
2834
2841
2844
2844
2899
3011
3229
3261
3519
3571
3631
3711
3825
3841
3842
3845
3861
3861
3944
3944
4724
4822
4822

NAICS
212312
311612
311513
311422
311412
31123
31132,31133
337214
32213
32213
322222
322291
323116
325211
325411
325412
325611
32562
32562
325998
326211
327212
327111
333618
334111
335221
336112
334514,334515
339112
339113
334510
333315
333315
339932
339932
56151
51331
51331

Dominated company

Classified industry catalogue

Leading Stone Mining Firm
Top Bacon Maker
Top Cheese Maker
Top Soup Maker
Top Frozen Dinner Maker
Top Cereal Maker
Largest Chocolate Candy Maker
Leading Office Furniture Maker
Top Bleached Paperboard Maker
Top Linerboard Maker
Top Tape Maker
Top Cleaning Cloth Maker
Leading Pressure-Sensitive Material Maker
Leading Polystyrene Marker
Top Multivitamin Maker
Top Drug Maker
Top Landry Detergent Maker
Top Toothpaste Maker
Top Baby Lotion
Top Rug/Room Deodorizer Maker
Highway Truck Tire
Leading Glass Container Maker
Plumbing Fixture
Leading Marine Diesel Engine Maker
Top Computer Maker
Top Appliance Maker
Top Light-Truck Vendor
Leading Automatic Meter Maker
Excessive Menstrual Bleeding Treatment
Drug-Coated Stent
Leading Pacemaker Firm
Top Digital Camera Maker
Largest Color Copier Maker
Leading Game Publisher
Leading Board Game Maker
Leading Online Travel Firm
Online Postal Market
Top News Site
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Vulcan Materials
Altria
Kraft Foods
Campbell Soup
ConAgra Foods, Inc.

Kellogg
Hershey
HNI
International Paper
Smurfit-Stone

3M
Clorox Co.
Avery Dennison
Dow Chemical
Wyeth Labs Inc.
Pfizer
Procter & Gamble
Colgate Oral Pharmaceuticals
Johnson & Johnson
Church & Dwight
Good Year
Owens-Illinois
AVX Corporation
Caterpillar

Dell
Whirlpool
General Motors
Itron

Cytyc
Boston Scientific
Medtronic
Kodak
Xerox
Electronic Arts
Hasbro
Expedia
Stamps.com
Yahoo

5231
6211
7372
7373
7375
7812

44412
52311
334611, 51121
541512
514191
51211

Leading Paint/Wallpaper Retailer
Leading Investment Banking Firm

Sherwin-Williams Co.
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

Top Web Brower

Microsoft

Top Server Makers in EMEA
Leading IT Service Firms in the EMEA
Top Documentary Firm

Hewlett-Packard
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IBM
Time Warner Inc.

Appendix B. - Market Share and HHI in 2005
Vulcan Materials

Leading Stone Mining Firms, 2005

12%

□ Vulcan M aterials
□ Martin M arietta M aterials
□ L afarge North A m erica

5%

□ O th e r

69%

HHI = 5,126.00
Altria

Top Bacon Makers, 2005

8.00%

11.00%

HHI = 1,862.00
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□
□
□
□
■
□

Altria
Sm ithfield Foods
H orm el
Tyson
Private label
O th er

Kraft Foods

Top Cheese Makers, 2005

'O

O

B Kraft Foods
■ Sargento Foods
□ Borden
□ Groupe Lactalis
■ Tillamook Country
□ Land O'Lakes
■ Private label
□ Other

O u

H H I = 2,061.17
Campbell Soup

□ Campbell S o u p
13 General Mills
□ ConAgra
□ Del Monte
■ CountryGourmet
□ Hain Celestial
D Private label
□ Other

Top Soup Makers, 2005

|: * f :|:fi
!■■■i M-p; ■p :

HHI = 3,074.55
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Ob
W.

ConAgra Foods, Inc.

T o p F ro z e n D in n e r M a k e rs , 2 0 0 5

50.6%
18.5%

□
B
□
□
■
□

ConAgra Inc.
Pinnacle Foods Products Inc.
N estle U S A Inc.
M arie Callender's
H ein z Frozen Foods
O th e r

H H I = 3,230.56

Kellogg

Top Cereal Makers, 2005

□ Kellogg
□ General Mills
□ Kraft Foods
□ Pepsico
■ Malt 0 Meal
□ Halt Celestial
□ Private label
□ Other

HHI =2,411.83
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Hershey

L arg est C h o co late C an d y M akers, 2005

23%

HHI = 3,121.13
HNI

L e ad in g O ffic e F u rn itu re M akers, 200 5

□ HNI
□ Steelcase Inc
□ Herm anM iller
□ Knoll
■ Other

HHI = 2,971.10

42

International Paper

T o p B le a c h e d P a p e rb o a rd M a k e rs , 2 0 0 5

B International Paper
■ MeadWestvaco
□ Potlatch
□ Georgia-Pacific
■ Rock-Ten n
(■Smurfit-Stone
E Blue Ridge Paper
□ Weyerhaeuser
■ Tembec
■ Other

HHI = 1,944.88
Smurfit-Stone

T o p L in e rb o a rd M a ke rs , 200 5

B Smurfit-Stone
o

■ Weyerhaeuser
□ International Paper
□ T e m p le -ls la n d

■ Georgia-Pacific
□ Packaging Corp. of America
B Green Bay Packaging
□ Longview Fibre
■ Boise Cascade
■ Norampac
□ Other

HHI = 1,333.06
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3M

Top Tape Makers, 2005

□ 3M
■ Manco Inc.
□ Le Pages, Inc. Div
□ Tri-Pak Inds.
■ Private label

H H I = 6,562.98
C lo ro x Co.

Top Cleaning Cloth firms, 2005

H Clorox
■ Lysol
□ Mr. Clean
□ Windex
■ Pledge
□ Glass Plus
□ Fantastik
□ Old English
■ Form ular 409
■ Murphy's Oil
□ Other

HHI = 1,970.25
44

Avery Dennison

Leading Preasure-Sensitive Material Makers, 2005

□ Avery Dennison
B Bemis
□ UPM-Kymmene (Raflatac)
□ Other

12%

HHI = 3,464.00
Dow Chemical

Leading Polystyrene Markers, 2005

12%

21%

HHI = 1,969.28
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Wyeth Labs Inc.

Top Multivitamin Makers, 2005

15.98%

22.06%
5.57% 7 1 1 o/o

19.38%

□
■
□
□
■
□

W yeth Labs Inc.
B a y e r C onsu m er H ealth Div
Knight M cD ow ell Labs
Bausch & Lom b Inc.
P rivate label
O th e r

HHI= 1,969.42
Pfizer

Top Drug M akers, 2005
□ Pfizer
□ GlaxoSmithKline
□ Johnson & Johnson
□ Merck & Co
■ AstraZeneca
□ Novartis
□ Sanofi-Aventis
□ Lilly
■ Bristol-Myers Squibb
□ Other

HHI = 2,640.98
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Procter & Gamble

Top Landry D ete rg e n t M akers, 2005

□ Procter & Gamble
□ Unilever
□ Church & Dwight
□ Henkel
■ Colgate
□ Private label
□ Other

3% 2% 3%

10%

14%

H H I = 3,982.00

Colgate Oral Pharmaceuticals

Top Toothpaste M arkers, 2005

□ Colgate Oral Pharmaceuticals
□ Procter & Gamble
□ GlaxoSmithKline
□ Church & Dwight
■ Oral-B Laboratories
□ Other

30.4%

HHI = 2,608.60
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Johnson & Johnson

Top Baby Lotion Makers, 2005
□ Johnson & Johnson
■ Aveeno
□ Johnson's Bedtime Lotion
□ Baby Magic
HHuggies
□ Gerber Grins & Giggles
■ Burt's Bees
□ Gerber Teeny Faces
■ Gerber Teeny Bodies
□ Johnson's Baby
□ Private label
mOther

HHI = 2510.33
Church & Dwight

Top Rug/Room Deodorizer Makers, 2005

□ Church & Dwight
□ S.C. Johnson Son
□ WD 40 Company
□ Rug Doctor Inc
■ Personal Care Products Inc.
□ Private label
□ Other

HHI = 3,046.52
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Good Year

Highway Truck Tire Markers, 2005

17%

34%

□ good year
■ M ic h e lin

□ Bridgestone
□ Firestone
17% ■ General
□ Yokohama
□ O th e r

HHI = 2,137.00
Owens-Illinois

Leading Glass Container Maker, 2005

HHI = 3,198.00
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AVX Corporation

Leading Pottery/Ceramic/Plumbing Fixture Makers,
2005

□ AVX Corporation
□ American Standard
□ARC International
10% □ Other

10%

H H I = 4,752.00

Caterpillar

L e a d in g M a rin e D ies e l E n g in e M a k e rs , 2 00 5

19%
11%

15%

HHI = 1,865.50
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□ Caterpillar
□ CM D
□ John Deere
□ Volvo Penta
■ Yanm ar
□ Other

Dell

Top Computer Makers, 2005

□ Dell
□ Hewlett-Packard
□ Gateway
□ Apple
■ Toshiba
□ Lenovo
□ Other

H H I = 2,492.40

Whirlpool

To p A p p lia n c e M akers, 2005

□ Whirlpool
□ General Electric
□ Maytag
□ Other

HHI = 2,750.00
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General Motors

Top Light-Truck Vendors, 2005

□ General Motors
0.74%

□ Ford Motor

7.07%6J0! i i ^

□ DaimlerChrysler

10.98%

□ Toyota Motor Sales
■ American Honda
□ Nissan North America

18.67%

23.75%

□ Hyundai-Kia Automotive
□ Mazda

H H I = 1,951.21

Itron

Leading A utom atic M eter M akers, 2005

19%

54%

13%

HHI = 3,552.00
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□
□
□
□
■

Itron
Cellnet
ESCO
Hunt
Other

Cvtvc

Excessive M enstrual Bleeding Treatm ents

12 %

□ Cvtvc
■ Johnson & Johnson
□ Boston Scientific
□ Other

H H I = 3,526.00

Boston Scientific

D u rg -C o a te d S te n t M a rk e t

41% .

- —
n Boston Scientific
■ Johnson & Johnson
59%

HHI = 5,162.00
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Medtronic

L e a d in g P a c e m a k e r F irm s, 2005

3.34%

22.-;:-,%
□ Medtronic

■ St. Jude
□ Guidant

50.72% □ O ther

H H I = 3,639.44

Kodak

Top Digital Cam era Makers, 2005

□ Kodak
□ Canon
□ Sony
□ Fujifilm
■ Nikon
□ Olympus
17.7%
□ Hewlett-Packard
□ Other

13.8%

8.6%

17.7%

HHI = 1,490.38
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Xerox

L a rg e s t C o lo r C o p ie r M akers, 2005

15%
!30%] □ Xerox
11%

■ Ricoh
□ Canon
□ Konica/Minolta
■ Other

17%
27%

HHI = 2,264.00
Electronic Arts

Leading Gam e Publishers, 2005

□ Electronic Arts
0 A ctivision
□ LucasArts
□ Nintendo
■ THQ
□ Sony Computer Entertainment
□ Take-Two Interactive
□ Konami
■ Microsoft
■ Vivendi
□ O ther

HHI = 1,387.72
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Hasbro

L e a d in g B o a rd G a m e M a k e rs , 2 0 0 5

15%
10%

□ Hasbro
□ Mattel
□ Other

H H I = 5,950.00

Expedia

Leading Online Travel Firms, 2005

7 .0 %

0 .2 %

□ Exnedia
47.0% □ Cendant
□ Sabre
□ Priceline
■ Other

22 .2 %

23.6%

HHI = 3,307.84
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Stamps.com

Online Postal Market, 2005

15%
n stamps.com
■ Other

HHI = 7,450.00
Yahoo

Top News Sites, 2005

□ Yahoo News
□ MSNBC
□ CNN
□AOL News
■ Gannett
□ Other

HHI = 2,145.43
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Sherwin-Williams Co.

P a in t a n d W a llp a p e r S to re s

□
■
□
□
■

S h e rw in -W illia m s C o.
P P G In d u s trie s
ICI P aints in N orth A m eric a
P rofessional P aint
O th e r

HHI = 5,098.42
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

L ead in g In v e s tm e n t B a n k in g Firm s, 200 5

32.1%

4.7%
5.7% 5.9%

5.9%

6-5%

HHI = 1,507.04
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□ Goldman Sachs
□ Citigroup
□ Morgan Stanley
□ Merrill Lynch
■ Lehman Brothers
□ JPMorgan
□ Credit Suisse First Boston
□ UBS
■ Banc of America
□ Deutsche Bank
□ Other

Microsoft

Top Web Browers, 2005

□ Microsoft
□ Mozilla Foundation
□ Apple Computer
□ Netscape Communications Corporation
■ Opera

□ Other

HHI = 7,344.49
Hewlett-Packard

Top Server Makers, 2005

□ Hewlett-Packard

9.8%
32.4%

10.2%

□ IBM
□ Sun Microsystems
□ Fujitsu/Fujitsu Siemens
■ Dell
□ Other

31.6%

HHI = 2,378.05
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IBM

L e a d in g IT S e rv ic e Firm s, 2005

□ IBM
■ A c ce n tu re
□ H ew lett-Packard Services
□ T-S ystem s
H C a p g e m in i
□ Atos Orgin
□ Other

H H I = 5,817.24

Time Warner Inc.

Top Docum entary Firms, 2005

□ W arner
0 Param ount

□ Sony Pictures
□ Fox
■ Image Ent
□ Ventura
□ A&E
□ Lionsgate
■ Madacy Ent.
■ Other

HHI = 1,967.46

60

VII. References
Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization” The American Economic Review, 62:5, pp. 777-795.
Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. 1981. “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers” The Bell Journal o f Economics, 12:2, pp. 605-617.
Blundell, R. Griffith, R. and Reenen, J. V. 1995. “Dynamic Count Data Models of
Technological Innovation” The Economic Journal, Vol.105, pp. 333-344.
Cho, S. 1992. “Agency Costs, Management Stockholding, and Research and
Development Expenditures” Seoul Journal o f Economics, Vol.5, pp. 127-152.
Cohen, W. M. and Levin, R, C. 1989. “Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market
Structure” in Schmalensee, R. and Willing, R., eds. Handbook o f Industrial Organization,
Vol.2, pp. 1059-1107.
Demsetz, H. 1983. “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of Firm” Journal o f Law
and Economics, Vol.26, pp. 375-390.
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. 1985. “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences” Journal o f Political Economy, Vol.93, pp. 1155-1177.
Dechow, P. and Sloan, R. 1991. “Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An
Empirical Investigation” Journal o f Accounting and Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 5189.
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control” Journal o f
Law and Economics, Vol.26, pp. 301-325.
Francis, J. and Smith, A. 1995. “Agency Costs and Innovation: Some Empirical
Evidence” Journal o f Accounting and Economics, Vol.19, pp. 383-409.
Hill, C. W. L. and Snell, S. A. 1989. “Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on
Corporate Productivity” Academy o f Management Journal, Vol.32, pp. 25-46.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.3,
pp. 305-360.

61

Morck, R. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1988. “Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis” Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.20,
pp. 293-315.
Narayanan, M. P. 1985. “Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results” The Journal o f
Finance, 5:5, pp. 1469-1484.
Pepall, L. Richards, D. J. and Norman, G. 2005. “Advertising, Competition, and Brand
Names” Industrial Organization Contemporary Theory & Practice; third edition, pp.
550.
Robert, S. L. 2007. “An Annual Compilation of Reported Market Share Data on
Companies, Products, and Services” Market Share Reporter, Farmington Hills, MI: Gale
Group,
Peter, C. 2005. “Old. Smart. Productive. Surprise! The Graying of the Workforce is
Better News than You Think” Business Week, pp. 78-86.
Scherer, F. M. 1965. “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output of
Patented Innovations” American Economic Review, Vol.55, pp. 1097-1125.
Symeonidis, G. 1996. “Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian
Hypotheses and Some New Themes” OECD Economics Department Working Papers,
No. 161.
Telser, L. 1964. “Advertising and Competition” Journal o f Political Economy, Vol.72,
pp. 537-562

62

